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The article paraphrases Netanyahu as saying that “the moratorium [on West Bank settlements] was a gesture aimed at making it easier for the Palestinians to enter direct talks,” but that since the Palestinians failed to “take advantage” of the gesture, walking out now would show they are “not serious about peace.” It seems to me that the clear reiteration by the Israeli government that the halting of settlements was both impermanent and symbolic is an admission of not being “serious about peace.” I’m not sure what it would mean to “take advantage” of a non-commitment to ceasing illegal activity.

The article then states a common view that “Efforts by the Obama administration to get Mr. Netanyahu to extend the freeze have so far been rejected.” Aside from public statements immediately followed by assurances that the U.S./Israel relationship is “special,” what are these “efforts”? We’re familiar with what “efforts” mean in other arenas reported on by the Times – e.g. tariffs against Chinese goods, sanctions against Iran, the invasion of Afghanistan. What have the “efforts” been to get Netanyahu to extend the freeze? I can think of one U.S. effort to help Netanyahu continue settlement activity – the continuation of massive military aid to Israel. A good article would give examples here. Remarkably, the Times itself had reported the administration’s stance in 2009 that efforts (in the sense of actions) are not on the table, whereas “largely symbolic” pressures – i.e. soothing words – are well underway. Has anything changed since then?

The article includes a completely irrelevant paragraph about the internal feelings of the director of the Anti-Defamation League.

Abraham H. Foxman, national director of the Anti-Defamation League, who was at the meeting with Mr. Abbas, said by telephone that he was impressed by two things: that the Palestinian president referred to Mr. Netanyahu as “my partner” and that he appeared to be seeking a way to stay at the negotiations even if some building began. On other issues, like Jerusalem and naming Israel a Jewish state, Mr. Foxman said Mr. Abbas did not please him.

What is the significance of this passage? Who cares about what words make Abraham Foxman tingle, or what gives him displeasure? Why does the article not describe the pleasure levels of any equally irrelevant leading American-Palestinian advocates? Was it because none were at the meeting? If so, why is that?

The article also fails to mention that Israeli settlements are in violation of international law, a grounding for the leading complaint of Palestinian leadership. This should be contrasted with leading Israeli complaints cited in the article, e.g. that the Palestinians demand an extended ban on illegal settlements.

And yes, I know the arguments. We cannot compare the actions of evil terrorists with the courage of our young men and women, defending our lives – and sacrificing theirs – on the front lines of the ‘war on terror”. There can be no “equivalence”. “They” kill innocents because “they” are evil. “We” kill innocents by mistake. But we know we are going to kill innocents – we willingly accept that we are going to kill innocents, that our actions are going to create mass graves of families, of the poor and the weak and the dispossessed.

This is why we created the obscene definition of “collateral damage”. For if “collateral” means that these victims are innocent, then “collateral” also means that we are innocent of killing them. It was not our wish to kill them – even if we knew it was inevitable that we would.

I have mentioned civilian casualties before, especially in Afghanistan, here and here. In the second link, note that in some cases, civilian casualties appear to be very much on purpose, including the subsequent cover-up.

The Fisk quote expresses my basic view. I think it is morally obscure to differentiate between two forms of actively killing a family when there was full awareness of such consequences in both cases. The moral story we tell ourselves is that when civilians die in an air-strike, it was morally justified by the good cause. What is interesting, and as far as I know never mentioned, is that this is exactly the justification for every politically or religiously motivated atrocity. Except in cases of pure sadism (say, a serial killer), no one kills just for fun. No one, for example, flies planes into buildings just for fun. Rather, people fly planes into buildings because they think the ensuing civilian deaths (doesn’t matter who, or how many) are worth whatever they take to be their noble cause (say, opposing American foreign policy, or trying to draw the West into an apparent war with Islam).

If we think civilian casualties can be justified by good causes, then we cannot coherently criticize the bad guys for their methods. We only have grounds to object to their cause. An apologist for state violence might think something like, “Consciously acting in a way that will result in the destruction of the bodies of innocents is justified by democracy promotion in Afghanistan.” Apologists for terrorism employ the same reasoning, but replace what comes after “justified by.” They might fill in “resisting occupation,” “establishing Islamic law,” “making enough money to eat,” “defeating the west,” or whatever.

I don’t think there has been serious discussion of the actual moral equivalence implied in the reasoning about civilian casualties. The self-serving fantasies of just war theorists never do the trick, because either (1) everyone is implicitly condemned or (2) everyone is implicitly justified.

There is at least one substantive difference between Us and Them with respect to civilian casualties, and it is important to acknowledge this difference, because it has an emotional hold on apologists for state violence. Because we have fancy things like an air force, our murder of civilians has a lottery structure: Usually, we know with certainty that, given the collection of stuff we do on purpose (e.g. invade Afghanistan, use drone strikes, etc.), innocents will be killed. However we usually don’t know who or exactly how many (although given experience, prediction is possible). For the bad guys, there is still a kind of lottery structure (e.g. who knows who or how many will be on the targeted bus?), but sometimes there is one difference: there is a goal of killing civilians.

Notice that it seems like the good guys could in principle still achieve their goals without killing a single civilian (arguably, they could achieve their goals better – the military spokespersons talk about killing civilians as a strategic, not a moral mistake), whereas if the bad guys failed to kill any civilians, they might see this itself as a failure in their mission.

But this is a superficial analysis. The bad guys don’t really have an ultimate goal of killing civilians. As for the good guys, killing civilians is a means to an end (say, the withdrawal of American troops). Both agree, notice, that the cost is “worth it.” If the insurgents in Afghanistan thought they could make the U.S. withdraw by dancing around in a circle, they would. Similarly, if the U.S. could achieve its goal by passing out candy, that would be the policy. But in both cases, deliberate actions which are known to cause civilian casualties have been deemed strategically necessary, and therefore morally justified.

GDP: United States — 13.8 trillion
Iran –$ 359 billion  (U.S. GDP is roughly 38 times greater than Iran’s)

Defense spending (2008):
U.S. — $692 billion
Iran — $9.6 billion (U.S. defense budget is over 70 times larger than Iran)

Military personnel:
U.S.–1,580,255 active; 864,547 reserves (very well trained)
Iran–   525,000 active; 350,000 reserves (poorly trained)

Combat aircraft:
U.S. — 4,090 (includes USAF, USN, USMC and reserves)
Iran — 312 (serviceability questionable)

Main battle tanks:
U.S. — 6,251 (Army + Marine Corps)
Iran — 1,613 (serviceability questionable)

Navy:
U.S. — 11 aircraft carriers, 99 principal surface combatants, 71 submarines, 160 patrol boats, plus large auxiliary fleet
Iran — 6 principal surface combatants, 10 submarines, 146 patrol boats

Nuclear weapons:
U.S. — 2,702 deployed, >6,000 in reserve
Iran – Zero